What is information? Is it physical? We argue that in a Bayesian theory the notion of information must be defined in terms of its effects on the beliefs of rational agents. Information is whatever constrains rational beliefs and therefore it is the force that induces us to change our minds. This problem of updating from a prior to a posterior probability distribution is tackled through an eliminative induction process that singles out the logarithmic relative entropy as the unique tool for inference. The resulting method of Maximum relative Entropy (ME), which is designed for updating from arbitrary priors given information in the form of arbitrary constraints, includes as special cases both MaxEnt (which allows arbitrary constraints) and Bayes' rule (which allows arbitrary priors). Thus, ME unifies the two themes of these workshops -the Maximum Entropy and the Bayesian methods -into a single general inference scheme that allows us to handle problems that lie beyond the reach of either of the two methods separately. I conclude with a couple of simple illustrative examples.
Introduction
The general problem of inductive inference is to update from a prior probability distribution to a posterior distribution when new information becomes available. This raises several basic questions which are the subject of this paper. First, what is information? It is clear that data "contains" or "conveys" information, but what does this precisely mean? Is information some sort of physical fluid that can be contained or transported? Is information physical ? Can we measure amounts of information? Do we need to? What is entropy?
A second set of questions revolves around our methods to process information. We know that Bayes' rule is the natural way to update probabilities when the new information is in the form of data and we know that Jaynes' method of maximum entropy, MaxEnt, is designed to handle information in the form of constraints [1] . At first sight these two methods appear unrelated. Are they compatible with each other? Are there other methods? Moreover, the range of applicability of either method is somewhat limited: Bayes' rule can handle arbitrary priors and data, and it can even handle some constraints, but not arbitrary constraints. On the other hand, MaxEnt can handle arbitrary constraints even data, but not arbitrary priors. Can we extend these methods?
As discussed in [2] the Shannon-Jaynes interpretation of entropy as a measure of uncertainty or of amount of information is somewhat problematic. The issue is not purely academic because the way equations are set up to solve a problem and even the kind of problems that we are willing to consider are affected by the particular meaning attributed to quantities such as entropy or probability. The Shannon-Jaynes interpretation was fairly adequate for their purposes, namely, communication theory and statistical mechanics, but it is not at all clear that their entropy with its attendant interpretation was the appropriate tool for the very different problem of updating probabilities.
The important contribution of Shore and Johnson [3] was the realization that any confusion surrounding the meaning of entropy could be, if not resolved, at least evaded by directly axiomatizing the procedure for updating probabilities instead of seeking dubious measures for a vaguely defined notion of information. Their argument, which is based on demanding consistency -if a problem can be solved in two different ways the two solutions must agree -is fundamentally sound. However, the detailed assumptions in their derivation have been criticized in [4, 5] .
Another approach to entropy was proposed by Skilling [6] . Although his axioms were clearly inspired by Shore and Johnson, the method was very different in two respects. First, Skilling was not directly concerned with the problem of updating probabilities; his method was designed for the determination of positive-additive functions such as intensities in an image. In retrospect we see that the application to this particular problem was quite unfortunate because when the method failed to produce good image reconstructions the natural reaction was a widespread loss of confidence about entropy methods in general.
The second difference, which I think is a truly significant contribution, is that Skilling's approach is a systematic method for induction. He spelled out in full detail how to construct a general theory from known special cases. The fundamental inductive principle is deceptively trivial: 'If a general theory exists it must apply to special cases'. The basic idea is that when there exists a special case that happens to be known all candidate theories that fail to reproduce it must be discarded. Thus, the known special cases -called the axioms of the theory -constrain the form of the general theory, and the idea is that a sufficient number of such constraints will determine the general theory completely. Of course, there is always the unfortunate possibility that the desired general theory does not exist, but if it does, then the search can be conducted in a systematic and orderly way.
Philosophers already had a name for such a method: they called it eliminative induction [7] . On the negative side, eliminative induction, like any other form of induction, is not guaranteed to work. It failed, for example, in Skilling's image reconstruction problem. On the positive side, eliminative induction adds an interesting twist to Popper's scientific methodology. According to Popper scientific theories can never be proved right, they can only be proved false; a theory is corroborated only to the extent that all attempts at falsifying it have failed. Eliminative induction is fully compatible with Popper's notions but the point of view is just the opposite. Instead of focusing on failure to falsify one focuses on success: it is the successful falsification of all rival theories that corroborates the surviving one. The advantage is that one acquires a more explicit understanding of why competing theories are eliminated.
The present paper is the third in a sequence devoted to clarifying the use of relative entropy as a tool for processing information and updating probabilities [2, 8] . In [2] we applied Skilling's method to the problem of Shore and Johnson. The answer to the question 'What is entropy?' turns out to be trivial and somewhat surprising: entropy needs no interpretation. We do not need to know what 'entropy' means, we only need to know how to use it. This explains why the "correct" interpretation had been so elusive -there is none. In [2] and then again in [8] the special cases, the axioms, were increasingly polished to clarify how alternative entropies are ruled out. Furthermore, in [2] we also discussed the question, central to any general method of updating, of the extent to which the distribution of maximum entropy is to be preferred over all others, the extent to which distributions with entropies less than the maximum are to be ruled out.
In this paper we review how eliminative induction leads to a unique candidate for a general theory of inference, the method of Maximum relative Entropy (ME), which is designed for updating from arbitrary priors given information in the form of arbitrary constraints. The three axioms used in [8] -locality, coordinate invariance, and consistency for independent subsystems -are sufficient to single out the logarithmic relative entropy as the unique tool for updating. In particular, we wish to elaborate further on the use of the third axiom -consistency for independent subsystems -to eliminate alternative entropies [12] .
The idea is rather simple. The known special cases covered under axiom 3 also include situations in which we have a large number N of independent identical systems where all sorts of inferences can be reliably carried out using various asymptotic techniques (laws of large numbers, large deviation theory, etc.). The close connection with the method of maximum entropy has been repeatedly emphasized by several authors [9] - [11] . We conclude that the logarithmic relative entropy is the only candidate for a general method for updating probabilities. Alternative entropies can be useful for other purposes -for example, when studying the information geometry of statistical manifolds -but not for a general theory of updating.
In [8] we showed that the ME method includes both MaxEnt and Bayes' rule as special cases and therefore it unifies the two dominant themes of these workshops -the Maximum Entropy and Bayesian methods -into a single general inference scheme that allows us to handle problems that lie beyond the reach of either of the two methods separately. I conclude with a couple of simple illustrative examples.
In a companion paper [13] we discuss the problem of multiple constraints.
Should the constraints be processed simultaneously or sequentially and, if so, in what order? There we also give an explicit example in which ME is used to simultaneously process information in the form of data and moment constraints.
What is information?
It is not unusual these days to hear that systems "carry" or "contain" information and that "information is physical". This mode of expression can perhaps be traced to the origins of information theory in Shannon's theory of communication. We say that we have received information when among the vast variety of messages that could conceivably have been generated by a distant source, we discover which particular message was actually sent. It is thus that the message "carries" information. The analogy with physics is straightforward: the set of all possible states of a physical system can be likened to the set of all possible messages, and the actual state of the system corresponds to the message that was actually sent. Thus, the system "conveys" a message: the system "carries" information about its own state. Sometimes the message might be difficult to read, but it is there nonetheless. This language -information is physical -useful as it has turned out to be, does not exhaust the meaning of the word 'information'. The goal of information theory, or better, communication theory, is to characterize the sources of information, to measure the capacity of the communication channels, and to learn how to control the degrading effects of noise. It is somewhat ironic but nevertheless true that this "information" theory is unconcerned with the central Bayesian issue of how the message affects the beliefs of a rational agent. A fully Bayesian information theory demands an explicit account of the relation between information and beliefs.
Our desire to update from one state of belief to another is driven by the conviction that not all probability assignments are equally good. One can argue that what makes one probability assignment better than another is that it better reflects some objective feature of the world, that it provides a better guide to the "truth" -whatever this might mean. The updating mechanism is supposed to allow us to incorporate information about the world into our beliefs.
The implication is that when confronted with new information our choices as to what we are honestly and rationally allowed to believe should become correspondingly restricted. This, I propose, is the defining characteristic of information: Information is whatever constrains rational beliefs. An important aspect of this notion is that for a rational agent the updating is not optional; it is a moral imperative. Information is whatever forces a change of rational beliefs.
Our definition captures an idea of information that is directly related to changing our minds: information is the driving force behind the process of learning. Note also that although there is no need to talk about amounts of information, whether measured in units of bits or otherwise, our notion of information allows precise quantitative calculations. Indeed, by information in its most general form, we mean the set of constraints on the family of acceptable posterior distributions and this is precisely the kind of information the method of maximum entropy has been designed to handle.
It may be worthwhile to point out an analogy with Newtonian dynamics. The state of motion of a system is described in terms of momentum -the "quantity" of motion -while the change from one state to another is explained in terms of an applied force. Similarly, in Bayesian inference a state of belief is described in terms of probabilities -the "quantity" of belief -and the change from one state to another is due to information. Just as a force is defined as that which induces a change in motion, so information is that which induces a change of beliefs.
Updating probabilities: the ME method
Consider a variable x which can be discrete or continuous, in one or several dimensions. The uncertainty about x is described by a probability distribution q(x). Our goal is to update from the prior distribution q(x) to a posterior distribution P (x) when new information -that is, constraints -becomes available. The constraints could be given in terms of expected values but this is not necessary. The question is: of all those distributions p(x) within the family defined by the constraints, which do we select?
As suggested by Skilling [6] to select the posterior it seems reasonable to rank the candidate distributions in order of increasing preference. It is clear that to accomplish this goal the ranking must be transitive: if distribution p 1 is preferred over distribution p 2 , and p 2 is preferred over p 3 , then p 1 is preferred over p 3 . Such transitive rankings are represented by assigning to each p(x) a real number S[p], which we will henceforth call entropy, in such a way that if
The selected distribution P (one or possibly many, for on the basis of the available information there may be several equally preferred distributions) will be that which maximizes the entropy S[p]. We are thus led to a method of Maximum Entropy (ME) that is a variational method involving entropies which are real numbers. These features are imposed on purpose; they are dictated by the function that the ME method is designed to perform.
Next, to define the ranking scheme, we must decide on the functional form of S[p]. First, the purpose of the method is to update from priors to posteriors. The ranking scheme must depend on the particular prior q and therefore the entropy S must be a functional of both p and q. Thus the entropy S[p, q] produces a ranking of the distributions p relative to the given prior q: S[p, q] is the entropy of p relative to q. Accordingly S[p, q] is commonly called relative entropy. Since all entropies are relative, even when relative to a uniform distribution, the modifier 'relative' is redundant and will be dropped.
Second, since we deal with incomplete information the method, by its very nature, cannot be deductive: the method must be inductive. The best we can do is use those special cases where we know what the preferred distribution should be to eliminate those entropy functionals S[p, q] that fail to provide the right update. The known special cases will be called (perhaps inappropriately) the axioms of the theory. They play a crucial role: they define what makes one distribution preferable over another.
The three axioms below are chosen to reflect the conviction that information collected in the past and codified into the prior distribution is very valuable and should not be frivolously discarded. This attitude is maximally conservative: the only aspects of one's beliefs that should be updated are those for which new evidence has been supplied. Furthermore, since the axioms do not tell us what and how to update, they merely tell us what not to update, they have the added bonus of maximizing objectivity -there are many ways to change something but only one way to keep it the same. Thus, we adopt the Principle of Minimal Updating (PMU): Beliefs should be updated only to the extent required by the new information. The three axioms, a brief motivation for them, and their consequences for the functional form of the entropy are listed below; more details and proofs are given in [2] and [8] . As will become immediately apparent the axioms do not refer to merely three cases; any induction from such a weak foundation would hardly be reliable. The reason the axioms are convincing and so constraining is that they refer to three infinitely large classes of known special cases.
Axiom 1: Locality. Local information has local effects. Suppose the information to be processed does not refer to a particular subdomain D of the space X of x's. In the absence of any new information about D the PMU demands we do not change our minds about D. Thus, we design the inference method so that q(x|D), the prior probability of x conditional on x ∈ D, is not updated. The selected conditional posterior is P (x|D) = q(x|D). The consequence of axiom 1 is that non-overlapping domains of x contribute additively to the entropy. Dropping additive terms and multiplicative factors that do not affect the overall ranking, the entropy functional can be simplified to the form
where F is some unknown function.
Axiom 2: Coordinate invariance. The system of coordinates carries no information.
The points x can be labeled using any of a variety of coordinate systems. One can always change coordinates but this should not affect the ranking of the distributions. The consequence of axiom 2 is that S[p, q] can be written in terms of coordinate invariants such as dx m(x) and p(x)/m(x), and q(x)/m(x):
(Again, additive terms and multiplicative factors that do not affect the overall ranking have been dropped.) Thus the unknown function F which had three arguments has been replaced by two unknown functions, one is a density m(x), and the other is a function Φ with two arguments. Next we determine the density m(x) by invoking the locality axiom 1 once again.
Axiom 1 (special case): When there is no new information there is no reason to change one's mind.
When no new information is available the domain D in axiom 1 coincides with the whole space X . The conditional probabilities q(x|D) = q(x|X ) = q(x) should not be updated and the selected posterior distribution coincides with the prior, P (x) = q(x). The consequence is that up to normalization m(x) must be the prior distribution q(x), which restricts the entropy to functionals of the form
Axiom 3: Consistency for independent subsystems. When a system is composed of subsystems that are known to be independent it should not matter whether the inference procedure treats them separately or jointly.
Suppose the information on two independent subsystems 1 and 2 is such that the prior distributions q 1 (x 1 ) and q 2 (x 2 ) are respectively updated to P 1 (x 1 ) and P 2 (x 2 ) when they are treated separately. When treated as a single system the joint prior is q 1 (x 1 )q 2 (x 2 ) and the family of potential posteriors is p(x 1 , x 2 ) = p 1 (x 1 )p 2 (x 2 ). The entropy functional must be such that the selected posterior is P 1 (x 1 )P 2 (x 2 ). The consequence of axiom 3 for this particular case of just two subsystems is that entropies are restricted to the one-parameter family given by
Once again, additive terms and multiplicative factors that do not affect the overall ranking scheme can be freely chosen. The η = 0 case reproduces the usual logarithmic relative entropy,
[Use y η = exp η log y ≈ 1 + η log y in eq. (4) and let η → 0 to get eq. (5).] In [8] we argued that the index η has to be the same for all systems. To see why consider any two independent systems characterized by η 1 and η 2 . Consistency between the joint and separate updates requires that η 1 = η 2 therefore η must be a universal constant. From the success of statistical mechanics as a theory of inference we inferred that the value of this constant must be η = 0 leading to the logarithmic entropy, eq.(5). Here we offer a different argument also based on a broader application of axiom 3:
Axiom 3 (special case): Consistency for large numbers of independent identical subsystems. The known special cases covered under axiom 3 include situations in which we have a large number N of independent identical systems. In such cases either the weak law of large numbers or large deviation theory in the form of Sanov's theorem are sufficient to make the desired inferences. Entropy considerations are not needed.
Let the x variables be discrete x i with i = 1 . . . m. The identical priors for the individual systems are q i and the available information is that the potential posteriors p i are subject, for example, to an expectation value constraint such as a = A, where A is some specified value and a = a i p i .
Consider the set of N systems treated jointly. Let the number of systems found in state i be n i , and let f i = n i /N be the corresponding frequency. In the limit of large N the frequencies f i converge (in probability) to the desired posterior P i while the sample averageā = a i f i converges (also in probability) to the expected value a = A. The probability of a particular frequency distribution f = {f 1 . . . f n } generated by the prior q is multinomial,
and for large N we have
where S[f, q] given by eq. (5), and where r N is a correction that vanishes as N → ∞. To find the most probable frequency distribution satisfying the constraintā = A one maximizes Q N (f |q) subject toā = A, which is equivalent to maximizing the entropy S[f, q] subject toā = A. The corresponding problem for the individual systems is that of maximizing S η [p, q] subject to a = A. The two procedures agree only when we choose η = 0. Therefore, entropies S η with η = 0 are not consistent with the laws of large numbers and must be discarded. Csiszar [10] and Grendar [11] have argued that the asymptotic argument above provides a valid justification for the ME method of updating. An agent whose prior is q receives the information a = A which can be reasonably interpreted as a sample averageā = A over a large ensemble of N trials. The agent's beliefs are updated so that the posterior P coincides with the most probable f distribution. This is quite compelling but, of course, as a justification of the ME method it is restricted to situations where it is natural to think in terms of ensembles with large N . This justification is not nearly as compelling for singular events for which large ensembles either do not exist or are too unnatural and contrived. From our point of view the asymptotic argument above does not by itself provide a fully convincing justification for the universal validity of the ME method but it does provide considerable inductive support. It serves as a valuable consistency check that must be passed by any inductive inference procedure that claims to be of general applicability.
The results are summarized as follows: The ME method: The objective is to update from a prior distribution q to a posterior distribution given the information that the posterior lies within a certain family of distributions p. 
Bayes' rule and its generalizations
The problem is to update our beliefs about θ ∈ Θ (θ represents one or many parameters) on the basis of three pieces of information: (1) the prior information codified into a prior distribution q(θ); (2) the data x ∈ X (obtained in one or many experiments); and (3) the known relation between θ and x given by the model as defined by the sampling distribution or likelihood, q(x|θ). The updating consists of replacing the prior probability distribution q(θ) by a posterior distribution P (θ) that applies after the data has been processed.
The crucial element that will allow Bayes' rule to be smoothly incorporated into the ME scheme is the realization that before the data information is available not only we do not know θ, we do not know x either. Thus, the relevant space for inference is not Θ but the product space Θ × X and the relevant joint prior is q(x, θ) = q(θ)q(x|θ). We should emphasize that the information about how x is related to θ is contained in the functional form of the distribution q(x|θ) -for example, whether it is a Gaussian or a Cauchy distribution -and not in the actual values of the arguments x and θ which are, at this point, still unknown.
Next we collect data and the observed values turn out to be x ′ . We must update to a posterior that lies within the family of distributions p(x, θ) that reflect the fact that x is known,
This data information constrains but is not sufficient to determine the joint distribution
Any choice of p(θ|x ′ ) is in principle possible. Additional input is needed and it is at this point that we invoke the Principle of Minimal Updating: beliefs need to be revised only to the extent required by the data. Accordingly the conditional prior q(θ|x ′ ) requires no revision and the selected posterior P (x, θ) is such that P (θ|x ′ ) = q(θ|x ′ ), or
The corresponding marginal posterior probability P (θ) is
which is recognized as Bayes' rule. This is extremely reasonable: we maintain those beliefs about θ that are consistent with the data values x ′ that turned out to be true. Data values that were not observed are discarded because they are now known to be false. 'Maintain' is the key word: it reflects the PMU in action. Remark: Bayes' rule is usually written in the form
and called Bayes' theorem. This formula is very simple; perhaps it is too simple. It is just a restatement of the product rule -valid for any x ′ whether observed or not -and therefore it is a simple consequence of the internal consistency of the prior beliefs. The drawback of this formula is that the left hand side is not a posterior but rather a prior (conditional) probability; it obscures the fact that an additional principle -the PMU -was needed for updating.
Next we show that Bayes' rule is consistent with, and indeed, is a special case of the ME method [8] . This is not too surprising given that the ME is also based on the PMU. According to the ME method the selected joint posterior P (x, θ) is that which maximizes the entropy,
subject to the appropriate constraints. Note that the information in the data, eq. (8), represents an infinite number of constraints on the family p(x, θ): for each value of x there is one constraint and one Lagrange multiplier λ(x). Maximizing S, (13), subject to (8) and normalization,
yields the joint posterior,
where Z is a normalization constant, and λ(x) is determined from (8),
so that the joint posterior is
from which we recover Bayes' rule, eq.(11). I conclude with a couple of very simple examples that show how the ME allows generalizations of Bayes' rule. The background for these generalized Bayes problems is the familiar one: We want to make inferences about some variables θ on the basis of information about other variables x. As before, the prior information consists of our prior knowledge about θ given by the distribution q(θ) and the relation between x and θ is given by the likelihood q(x|θ); thus, the prior joint distribution q(x, θ) is known. But now the information about x is much more limited. Example 1.-The data is uncertain: x is not known. The marginal posterior p(x) is no longer a sharp delta function but some other known distribution, p(x) = P D (x). This is still an infinite number of constraints
that are easily handled by ME. Maximizing S, (13), subject to (18) and normalization, leads to
The corresponding marginal posterior,
is known as Jeffrey's rule. Example 2.-Now we have even less information: p(x) is not known. All we know about p(x) is an expected value
Maximizing S, (13), subject to (21) and normalization, δ S + α dxdθ p(x, θ) − 1 + λ dxdθ p(x, θ)f (x) − F = 0 ,
where the normalization constant Z and the multiplier λ are obtained from Z = dx q(x)e λf (x) and d log Z dλ = F .
The corresponding marginal posterior is P (θ) = q(θ) dx e λf (x) Z q(x|θ) .
The two posteriors (20) and (25) are sufficiently intuitive that one could have written them down directly without deploying the full machinery of the ME method, but they do serve to illustrate the essential compatibility of Bayesian and Maximum Entropy methods. A less trivial example is given in [13] .
Conclusions
Any Bayesian account of the notion of information cannot ignore the fact that Bayesians are concerned with the beliefs of rational agents. The relation between information and beliefs must be clearly spelled out. The definition we have proposed -that information is that which constrains rational beliefs and therefore forces the agent to change its mind -is convenient for two reasons. First, the information/belief relation very explicit, and second, the definition is ideally suited for quantitative manipulation using the ME method. The other main conclusion is that the logarithmic relative entropy is the only candidate for a general method for updating probabilities -the ME method -which includes MaxEnt and Bayes' rule as special cases; it unifies them into a single theory of inductive inference.
It is true that there exist many different ways to define measures of separation, or divergence between distributions and that these "entropies" can be useful in a wide variety of ways. In fact, it was precisely this wealth of possibilities that Shore and Johnson intended to avoid. These other "entropies" can be useful for other purposes but not for updating; at least not for an updating theory that strives to achieve universal applicability. Let us emphasize that the reason the ME method uses the logarithmic entropy as the tool for updating is not that this entropy has been shown to provide the correct measure of distance -there are many other such measures. We do not even claim that inferences on the basis of the ME method are guaranteed to be correct -this is induction; there are no guarantees. It is just that all alternative entropies are much worse because in known cases they give answers that are demonstrably wrong.
